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Abstract
The field of political violence has consistently emphasized understanding the way that civil wars
end, with less emphasis placed on the circumstances which elicit extended civil war duration.
This analysis shifts the focus of study on to the internal factors of civil war, following the
question: What are the domestic factors of civil war that cause some wars to be more durable
and resistant to resolution than others? Building off of several prominent theories within the
field of political violence and the anthropological study of ethnic saliency, I hypothesize that
civil wars that are characterized as identity based will be more susceptible to a renewed security
dilemma in the face of terrorism, resulting in more durable conflicts. Using a series of
regressions and hazard models to analyze data on civil wars and terrorist events from 1970 to
2014, I test my primary hypothesis, as well as my secondary hypothesis which asserts that
identity based civil wars will experience terrorism at a higher frequency than their non-identity
based counterparts. The results do not provide support for my hypothesis regarding civil war
type, but instead demonstrate a significant link between terrorism, particularly a form a terrorism
known as spoiling, and the extended duration of civil wars. My findings overwhelmingly suggest
that spoiling is likely a highly predictive indicator of war durability, while civil war type does
not seem to be having a significant impact on duration or on the frequency of spoiling. I
conclude with a brief look into the implications for future research and policy, emphasizing the
need for a better understanding of this overlap between terrorism and civil war.
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Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the world has witnessed a remarkable shift in the trends of war
and world conflict: the rapid decline in the frequency of interstate conflicts with the frequency of
civil wars rising steadily in their place. This puzzle of conflict development has drawn interest
from academics in the field of political science as a whole, particularly from scholars of political
violence, who have constructed a robust literature regarding the processes of civil war and the
way that civil wars end. Civil war has very quickly become widely known as a distinctly violent
and costly form of conflict, often coexisting with countless other forms of political violence
(Mason & Mitchell 2016). Given this volatile and troubling nature of civil wars, there is a vested
interest in better understanding these conflicts, particularly how they end.
The large majority of scholarship on the resolution of civil wars has focused primarily on
the type of resolutions that are most successful or on the ways in which factors outside of the
domestic dynamics of the civil war impact its likelihood of resolution. Despite this robust and
extensive research regarding the way that wars end, the field has neglected to pursue significant
study regarding the factors that work to actually make civil wars harder to resolve. This study
works to target this gap by asking the question: What are the domestic factors of civil war that
cause some wars to be more durable and resistant to resolution than others? This question is an
attempt to shift the lens of study towards the internal mechanisms and dynamics affecting civil
wars in order to better understand their processes and what keeps them from resolution.
Over the course of this study, I argue that the internal factors of a conflict, particularly the
civil war type, are the most influential factors influencing war duration; to be specific, I argue
that identity based civil wars, wars centered around ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity, will
be more resistant to resolution than other non-identity based wars. Working with pre-existing
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theories in the field, specifically relative deprivation and the security dilemma, I work to
incorporate a more holistic understand of the way civil war processes vary by closely examining
the comorbidities of civil war and another prominent form of political violence: terrorism. I
believe that, by understanding the way that terrorism occurs and varies across civil war types, we
can gain a better understanding of why some wars tend to be more durable than others as well as
begin to target the precise relationships that are eluding resolution.
In this analysis, I work to better understand the interaction of political violence within the
context of civil war, pushing back on the implicit frame that prior research has employed which
treats terrorism and civil war as perfectly independent occurrences despite the significant overlap
that is found between them (Findley & Young 2012). I advance two hypotheses regarding the
interaction between three variables of interest: war type, terrorism, and the duration of civil wars.
My primary hypothesis, referred to as the Polarized Identity hypothesis, asserts that wars that can
be characterized as identity based will be more impacted by terrorism events that non-identity
based wars, resulting in extended war duration for identity based conflicts. My second
hypothesis suggests simply that events of terrorism will be more common and more frequent in
identity based wars than in their non-identity based counterparts. This hypothesis come out of the
literature’s understanding of the ethnic security dilemma and the way that terrorism operates
outside of the context of conflicts. While these theories center around terrorism as the driving
force behind extended war duration, I argue firmly that it is the underlying war type which
determines the extent to which terrorism will impact the war’s resistance to resolution.
I begin this study in Chapter 2 with a review of the relevant literature of civil war, the
factors that we know impact conflict duration, terrorism, as well as theories of ethnicity and
communal conflict. I draw literature primarily from the field of political violence to best
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understand the process of civil war and the conceptualizations of terrorism. It is in this chapter
that I also decide to narrow my focus from the larger concept of terrorism to the subcategory of
spoiling, a form of terrorism which seeks to spoil attempts at peace (Kydd & Walter 2006). In
order to best understand the ways in which identity impacts conflict, I supplement my discussion
on ethnicity and communal conflict with anthropological and sociological research that allows
for a more well-rounded conceptualization of identity based conflict and the way that identity
can become increasingly salient in the face of civil war. After addressing some of the gaps
currently existing in the literature, I work to apply the theoretical frameworks of the field to my
question, and I propose my theoretical explanations and my two aforementioned hypotheses.
In Chapter 3, I work to carefully construct a quantitative study, modeled after prior
research done in the field, in order to test my hypothesis as directly as possible. I begin by
explaining and justifying my decision to pursue a quantitative analysis, pointing to the precedent
set by the field. I proceed by operationalizing my variables based on their previous use in the
field, defining my coding processes, and introducing my data sources. Additionally, I lay out the
datasets assembled for the purpose of this study and explain the tentative process of my
empirical analysis. Finally, I address some of the methodological limitations of my study and the
general expectations of my analysis.
To put my hypotheses to the test, I utilize a series of models to examine every aspect of
my hypotheses over the course of Chapter 4. I begin by summarizing my data and pulling out
relevant significant correlations that carry weight in respect to my hypotheses. Next, I run a
series of Chi² correlation tests, negative binomial regressions, and Cox proportional hazard
models; then, I interpret these results in terms of the impact, or rather lack thereof, that war type
has on duration of war and magnitude of spoiling. I close this chapter by reevaluating my
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original hypotheses in light of my results and illustrating these findings using a brief comparative
case study of two prominent civil wars within my data.
Finally, I conclude my study in Chapter 5 by offering a brief overview of my original
theoretical framework and summarizing my overall findings, which suggest that it is spoiling
alone, not war type, that significantly increases the duration of civil wars. I quickly touch on the
methodological difficulties within this study before proceeding to highlight the implications that
my results have both on future research in this field and on the general policy regarding civil war
resolution and the handling of terrorism within civil conflict. Finally, I conclude by rejecting my
original Polarized Identity hypothesis and offering my final thoughts on the intersection of civil
war and spoiling, as well as the ways in which this overlap should be handled in future study.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature and Theoretical Frameworks
Introduction
In order to tackle the question of interest in my study, I will begin by examining the
existing literature on civil war, terrorism and ethnicity. Specifically, I review the literature on
factors that affect war duration and resolution, then I focus my study on the spoiling subcategory
of terrorism. Finally, I review the prominent theories in the study of civil war and ethnic saliency
and further apply that to my question in order to pose my theoretical explanation and hypotheses.
Literature Review
On civil war
Given the complexities of modern civil conflict, one of the first hurdles for academics is
managing to consistently operationalize crucial events. In the development of political violence
as a field, much of the literature has focused prominently on how events and terms are
conceptualized with distinct benchmarks to capture the target event. Civil war has been defined
by the field through four basic parameters: (1) an armed conflict occurring within a single state
(2) involving active participation from the incumbent government and (3) effective resistance
from both sides of the conflict (4) with at least 1,000 battle deaths accumulated within a calendar
year (Sambanis 2004; Small & Singer 1982). Controversy surrounding certain aspects of this
definition certainly exists, particularly surrounding the death threshold and the concept of
effective resistance; however, this conceptualization has established long-lasting precedence in
the field and is therefore the most reliable measure of civil conflict.
Several prominent theories have emerged among scholars to explain why civil conflict
occurs and how it unfolds. The theory of relative deprivation, as popularized by Ted Gurr in his
book Why Men Rebel, quickly became a hallmark of the field in the early years. Emerging
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alongside many post-colonial theories, this theory suggests that violent collective action is most
likely to occur when a group or individual believes they are receiving less than they should
reasonably expect from the circumstances of the state (Gurr 1970; Mason & Mitchell 2016).
Subsequent scholars would later expand on this theory, using newer terminology of vertical and
horizontal inequality. “Vertical inequality” has been used to refer to the inequalities between
individuals among a polity, whereas “horizontal inequality” refers to the broader context of
inequality across groups and communities within the polity. Leaning on the theoretical
foundations of relative deprivation, the literature has suggested that high levels of horizontal
inequality combined with social polarization are positively correlated with the outbreak of
intrastate conflict (Ostby 2008).
Other prominent theories of civil war onset are the greed and grievance hypothesis set
forth of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. The greed theory of civil war considers rebellions to be
similar in nature to organized crime, particularly in that they profit off of the extortion of another
party. Through this lens, the theory puts forward an examination of the cost-benefit analysis of
violence, looking particularly at potential for start-up funding, potential gains of victory, and the
access to diaspora or other non-domestic sources of aid (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). Closer in
nature to relative deprivation, the grievance theory suggests that rebellions may be similar to
protest movements that have taken a different path of progression, focusing on the presence of
grievances such as communal conflict, political exclusion, and previous history of conflict and
violence. The consensus among scholars has been that these perspectives are most applicable
when utilized together; “greed rebellions need to generate grievance for military cohesion, [and]
grievance rebellions might be driven to predation to raise finance” (Collier & Hoeffler 2004).
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Moving beyond the onset of civil conflict, the literature generally agrees that civil wars
tend to be longer, more pervasive, and more difficult to end than interstate wars. Trends in
organized violence associated with civil war have shown that the number of fatalities related to
organized violence have dropped for several consecutive years while the number of active
conflicts continues to increase, with this puzzling trend attributed to the fact that modern civil
conflicts are becoming harder and harder to solve (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019).
Scholars have posited that the increasing challenges in solving intrastate conflict may be related
to the increase in explicit religious claims involved in wars and the increase in the
internationalization of such wars.
Other findings have also suggested that low per capita income, high levels of inequality
(measured by the Gini coefficient), and moderate ethnic divisions (measured on a scale of 1 to
100) are all positively correlated with war duration (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).
Other studies have advanced that the perceived cost of fighting is an additional influential factor
in determining the duration of war, suggesting that wars last longer when at least one warring
party perceives that cost of war to be relatively low and when they perceive their likelihood of
winning optimistically (Cunningham 2017). The literature has also found that weaker states may
be more prone to extended war duration (Cunningham 2017). A variety of explanations for the
troubling prolongation of civil wars exist, however, there is not currently a firm consensus on
what factors are most influential in triggering the causal sequence of war duration.
When civil wars do finally end, it is often through a negotiated settlement; thus, when
factors within the war, such as high levels of fractionalization or multiple rebel groups, make
bargaining more difficult, negotiation becomes less likely and war duration increases
(Cunningham 2017). Scholars have identified three approaches to civil war which are likely to
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impact the peace process: rebellion as investment, rebellion as business, and rebellion as mistake.
Rebellion as investment refers to an approach to conflict in which the critical incentive of
rebellion in the post-conflict payoff, making this the sole approach of the three that is receptive
to negotiation. Rebellion as business, in which the incentive is pay-off during the conflict, and
rebellion as mistake, in which one side’s military optimism blocks receptivity to any potential
agreement, are both antagonistic to negotiation and tend to result in prolonged duration of war
(Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom 2004).
Additional studies have examined civil wars from a rational choice perspective,
advancing a utility model which looks at the choice between seeking immediate settlement or
continuing to fight. Findings have suggested that a negotiated settlement becomes less likely the
larger a government's army becomes and more likely the longer the war goes on, while other
variables such as potential payoffs and the costs of war had no impact (Mason and Fett 1996).
Other studies have found that when war extends beyond the first year, the overall likelihood of a
negotiated peace in subsequent years tends to decline (Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000).
Conventional wisdom would suggest that this decline in likelihood of a negotiated peace after the
first year of conflict stems from the cost benefit analyses of the warring parties. After the first
year of conflict, parties may perceive more potential gains from a military victory or continued
fighting than they would from a negotiated peace. Additionally, rebel groups may grow more
radicalized or gain access to additional resources over the course of that first year that would
lower the costs of war. There are several plausible arguments that may explain why the
likelihood of settlements decreases after the first year of conflict, but the field has yet to lower
the magnifying glass on this particular issue in order for us to substantiate any one theory.
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The current literature has yet to put forth a concise, singular understanding of how and
when civil wars end, but even disputed findings have consistently held that civil war is durable
and evasive to resolution across all contexts. Even the causes for that finding are largely argued
in the field; however, there is some semblance of agreement regarding what variables exacerbate
the duration of civil war, with third-party intervention rankings at the very top of that list.
Across the literature, third party or foreign intervention has been defined as any and all
involvement, including humanitarian aid, monetary support, conflict management, or military
involvement, of a third party outside of the state and its participating combatants or rebel groups
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce 2008; Mason & Mitchell 2016). Beyond this general
understanding, scholars have further established a typology of intervention: (1) those that attempt
to influence the structure of the relationship among combatants and (2) those that attempt to
manipulate the information that these actors hold (Regan and Aydin 2006). Following this
typology, the argument emerges that the first type will increase war duration, while the second
will decrease duration, with the findings suggesting that diplomatic interventions increase the
likelihood that the conflict ends in the next month, but the effort of diplomacy degrades over
time (Regan and Aydin 2006). Regardless of what the effect of intervention is, the literature
suggests that its effect degrades over time.
In terms of what the effects of intervention are, several important studies have established
several notable trends in the way intervention unfolds over the course of civil wars. The field
widely accepts foreign intervention as a factor that inherently prolongs the duration of war, with
this finding corroborated in several studies (Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Mason & Mitchell
2016; Narang 2014). More specific findings have suggested that there may be further stipulations
regarding the effect on balanced and imbalanced intervention. In a comprehensive study
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regarding the intervention process, the outcome of civil war was found to vary based on the side
supported by a third party, concluding that (1) one sided intervention leads to higher likelihood
of military victory for the supported party, (2) one sided support for the incumbent government
increases likelihood of negotiated settlement, and (3) dual sided intervention decreases likelihood
of both negotiated settlement and military victory, thus, increasing war duration (Balch-Lindsay,
Enterline, & Joyce 2008). Findings have also suggested that when ethnic conflict and
intervention coexist, the duration of war increases significantly (Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000).
The literature tells us in significant uniformity that intervention is precarious even under
the best conditions, with dozens of variables impacting the success – or lack thereof – of an
intervening party. We know very little about how and why the processes of foreign intervention
behave in civil wars and we know even less about how intervention interacts with other elements
of civil war including war type and war related terrorism. In order to best understand the way
that outside actors impact the dynamics of intrastate warfare, it is essential to first understand the
domestic factors that influence and extend duration, beginning with the effect that identity based
conflict can have, particularly as it interacts with other variables.
On terrorism and spoiling
While typically studied as an independent concept within the field of political violence,
much research has suggested that terrorism and civil war may be much more intertwined than the
scholarship reflects. Recent data has shown a significant degree of overlap in occurrences of
terrorism within ongoing civil wars, as well as notable occurrences of terrorism immediately
preceding or following civil wars (Findely and Young 2012). This suggests that, in order to
foster a holistic understanding of both terrorism and civil war, the field as a whole may need to
converge in its research and exploration of this complex interaction.
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Within the field of political violence, terrorism has been broadly defined as “the
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTD Codebook
2019). In order to be officially coded as a terrorism event, the event must intentional, entail a
threat or act of violence, and be committed by sub-national actors. Further scholarship has
identified five primary goals of terrorism, including regime change, territorial change, policy
change, social control, and status quo maintenance, and further divided the broader category of
terrorism into subdivisions based on the target and goal of the event (Kydd and Walter 2006).
Terrorism targeting an enemy typically falls into the category of either attrition or spoiling,
whereas terrorism employed against the actor’s own population is categorized as intimidation,
outbidding, or provocation.
Looking closer at each of these strategies, it can be argued that acts of terrorism serve at
least partially as a master class in persuasion. Attrition involves a group inflicting serious and
severe costs on the enemy in order to present a credible threat and persuade the targeted enemy
that the terrorist group is strong, resolute, and unyielding, often resulting in an unwinnable battle
of wills (Kydd and Walter 2006). In a similar strain, spoiling involves staging an attack in order
to deter a potential peace deal by playing on the re-existing mistrust between moderates at the
bargaining table (Kydd and Walter 2006). This strategy operates by convincing the opposition
that the moderates seeking peace will not be able to keep their own followers in check reliably
enough to uphold the peace deal. Both of these strategies seek to persuade the opposition that the
group utilizing terrorism has more power and influence than the may realistically possess.
Turning to the strategies that target the actor’s own group, this assumption of inherent
persuasion generally holds. Intimidation is typically understood as a strategy of deterrence, in
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which a group uses threats and acts of violence as costly signals to the power that the group has
to punish any dissent (Kydd and Walter 2006). Not only does this strategy work to persuade the
population of the group’s resolve and commitment, and to suggest that the government is
powerless to intervene. On the other hand, outbidding occurs when there are two competing
groups, and the population is unsure which would best serve its interests. A group may use a
terrorist attack to signal that they have greater militant strength and are more capable of pursuing
the greater conflict than the opposing group. Finally, provocation is typically used to shift the
support of the population away from the incumbent government and to the rebel group wherein
the rebel group uses violence to goad the government into a militant response that will inevitably
harm civilians (Kydd and Walter 2006). Much like the strategies targeting the enemy, these
strategies also work as tactics of persuasion and are utilized by groups in a variety of contexts.
The literature on civil wars and terrorism has suggested that these two forms of political
violence overlap quite significantly, implying that we may very likely see several of these
strategies at work in any given civil war. However, when it comes to examining the specifics of
civil war resolution, spoiling offers a significant amount of explanatory power in answering the
question of why wars end - or rather, why they don’t.
As previously mentioned, spoiling refers to an attack on an enemy with the intent of
“spoiling” or ruining a potential peace deal (Kydd & Walter 2006). The goal in a spoiling event
is to provoke a wave of distrust between the moderates that are pursuing a settlement. The
rationale of spoiling operates under the assumption that parties will be hesitant to step into an
agreement when they are suspicious of the opposing party’s ability to uphold the agreement, and
that this suspicion and lack of trust will eventually reignite conflict. Groups that employ terror
typically utilize this strategy to assert their own power to their all sides of the conflict by
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signaling that they are ready and willing to pursue further violence given the opportunity. This
culmination of this process is the persuasion of moderates on both sides of the conflict to step
back from any potential negotiations, reigniting conflict (Kydd & Walter 2006).
In the context of civil war, scholars have conceptualized spoiling at an action of violence
from one side of a conflict that has potential to affect the outcome of the peace process (Findley
& Young 2015; Mason & Mitchell 2016). In these situations, warring parties are often referred to
as “potential spoilers,” indicating that any side of a civil conflict could utilize this technique,
regardless of civil war type. This further implies that, the more parties or rebel groups are present
in a conflict, the more potential spoilers there are in that particular context, particularly if they
are not all included in any subsequent negotiation processes. In a study encompassing 241 civil
war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era, it was established that spoiling events intended
to thwart a peace deal are actually less common than expected and are not as successful as one
may assume, with not many spoiling events posing a significant risk to the completion of the
peace deal, despite the attention and publicity given to the events (Reiter 2015). This study
further concluded that the actor seeking to spoil the peace was likely a key variable in the
success of spoiling, finding that certain types of actors, notably paramilitaries and security
forces, can pose a serious threat to peace progression. Government security forces can pose a
particularly difficult threat when there are splits within elites, allowing forces within the
government that have access to arms to spoil potential settlements based on disagreements with
the moderates in power.
A similar study looked more broadly at the effect terrorism has on civil war peace
processes and found that, while terrorism may not see an immediate effect in spoiling the peace,
it can derail the peace process over time and make long term cessation more evasive (Findely

13

and Young 2015). Despite the suggestion that spoiling may not be as successful as one would
expect, the literature has consistently affirmed that "the use of terrorism can spoil peace
processes by prolonging the duration of a war hastening the time until recurrence, (Findely and
Young 2015). While the data on spoiling in civil wars, let alone in ethnic civil wars, is relatively
limited at the time being, the literature does provide significant evidence to suggest that spoiling
is a significant indicator of a conflict that will be significantly more difficult to resolve.
On ethnicity and communal identity
The topic of ethnicity has been studied extensively across countless fields, from politics
to psychology to economics, but scholars have yet to nail down exactly how this form of identity
interacts with cases of political violence. First and foremost, identity has been conceived as a
form of social category that is based on some form of “fundamental and consequential
sameness,” with ethnicity falling as a subset of this broader definition (Mason and Mitchell
2016). Ethnicity has been defined as a perception of likeness among members of a particular
group, where the eligibility for membership is based on attributes of common origin, that leads
the group to view others prejudicially, or as outsiders (Mason and Mitchell 2016, Blanton and
Kegley 2017). The main property of these attributes, or “ethnic markers,” is their inability to be
changed in the short term and their visibility to other members in society. Generally speaking,
they include genetic features such as skin color, hair type, and other physical features, as well as
cultural or historical features including name, language, and place of birth. Furthermore, scholars
have also worked to study the strength of these ethnic markers, leading to two major
expectations. Firstly, stronger the ethnic markers are between rival groups, the easier it is for
members of one group to be singled out and discriminated against; secondly, the strength of
ethnic markers is negatively correlated with assimilation between groups and positively
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correlated with conflict (Mason and Mitchell 2016). From these general characteristics comes the
concept of ethnic nationalism, which refers to a group’s primary allegiance and devotion being
connected with their cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity rather than the state they reside in
(Blanton and Kegley 2017).
While often considered synonymous with ethnic identity, religious identity varies in that
it is typically less visible, harder to identify (or easier to conceal), and easier to change in the
short term. The concept of religious identity is based in the system of practices and belief in
spiritual attainment by means of adhering to specific codes of behavior or established community
practice (Toft 2011, Mason and Mitchell 2016). While they often overlap, the distinction
between ethnicity and religion becomes more salient when the identities clash, such as in the
case of Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims or in Irish Protestant and Catholics. Similar to ethnic
identity, religious identity often exists transnationally, transcending the constraints of a state’s
borders (Blanton and Kegley 2017).
The question of where communal identity comes from has been hotly contested among
scholars of sociology and anthropology in particular, with the primary arguments falling into the
dichotomy of primordial origins and constructionist origins. Respectively, these theories suggest
that ethnicity is either innate and fixed or that it is socially constructed by the society that one
exists in; however, the literature has evolved away from this polarization, suggesting that the
answer likely lies somewhere in between (Hale 2004). Prominent arguments now suggest that
ethnicity, and communal identity as a whole, acts as a “social radar” for individuals, offering
them a framework through which they can navigate the world as they perceive it (Hale 2004).
The implication here is that, while identity may hold innate importance at the individual level, is
likely situational and ever-changing depending on the cultural and societal context. To this point,
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the argument has been posited that ethnicity gains salience in a society when the society itself
emphasizes it; thus, if a conflict were to arise between ethnic groups, those respective identities
may become more and more important as they become the center of everyday life within the
conflict.
This complex framework of communal identity leads to the question of how to capture
such a subjective variable in a manner that is relatively consistent and appropriate for academic
study. Scholars typically use a wide variety of measures in order to capture polarization and
fractionalization of identity within a current population. Early scholars relied primarily on
measures of “ethno-linguistic fractionalization,” or ELF, which examines ethnic, linguistic, and
religious diversity or fractionalization within a population, focusing additionally on the levels of
inequality in resources or power distribution among different groups (Campos and Kuzeyev
2007, Mason and Mitchell 2016). This measure continues to be one of the main indicators of
significant ethnic heterogeneity, resulting in consistent findings that very homogenous societies
with little to no diversity and very diverse societies where no one group constitutes a major or
can easily dominate others consistently show a lower risk of civil conflict (Mason and Mitchell
2016). Despite the consensus in the field surrounding this general finding, the ELF measure has
long been criticized for being a rather static look at fractionalization that does not accurately
account for the variations in the political salience of different identities. Several additional
datasets have been created to help measure this concept, including the Minorities at Risk project,
which examines cases wherein the identities in question are already subject to mistreatment, and
the index of politically relevant ethnic groups, which measures how far the distribute of groups is
from a bipolar distribution and is able to better capture the degree of polarization (Mason and
Mitchell 2016). Overall, the scholarship is in agreement that fractionalization is best understood
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through a multitude of variables such as cultural difference, income and resource inequality,
geographical separation, as well as several other factors. These evolving understandings of
identity and ethnic fractionalization can create an interesting composite image, revealing certain
causes of internal conflict and pinpointing potential roadblocks to resolution.
On communal conflict and civil war
When looking at the intersection of identity polarization and civil conflict, the entire
picture tends to get a bit blurrier. While the prevalence of civil war since the end of WWII has
been thoroughly established, the vast majority of civil wars in the post-Cold War era have been
classified as “communal” civil wars, wars of identity; in fact, some accounts suggest that as
many as 64 percent of all civil wars fought in the past several decades have been fought along
ethnic lines (Mason and Mitchell 2016). This trend has been explained primarily through two
major theories: the aforementioned theory of relative deprivation and the clash of civilizations
(Mason and Mitchell 2016, Blanton and Kegley 2017). While the condition of relative
deprivation can and does arise from situations removed from communal identity, it would
logically follow that if a state allocates resources or power differently across groups, one ethnic
group could perceive themselves as “relatively deprived” compared to a rival group. Further
scholarship has supported this argument, suggesting that ethnic conflict is rooted in social
psychology of group dynamics and entitlements that evoke strong emotional reactions as rival
groups dispute their relative superiority within a state or geographical region (Horowitz 1985,
Mason and Mitchel 2016). On the other hand, the clash of civilizations argument, as developed
by Samuel Huntington, suggests much more plainly that the existence of multiple cultures,
ethnicities, or religions occupying a single space would be inherently contentious regardless of
resource allocation (Mason & Mitchell 2016, Blanton and Kegley 2017). This theory has
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garnered much less support in academia, as most scholars have found that diversity in and of
itself is no more prone to conflict or civil war than social homogeneity (Carment & James 2000).
On the contrary, studies have found that states at risk of ethnic conflict must is not affected by
ethnic diversity per se, but rather by the levels of “ethnic dominance” within a state, where a
clear imbalance of power can be perceived between groups (Carment & James 2000, 176).
Returning to the previously discussed theories of greed and grievance, some scholars
suggest that ethnic civil wars are instigated by three causal mechanisms that revolve closely
around rational choice theory. This argument suggests that modern rebel groups are more likely
to organize around identity because polarized ethnic groups are (1) more likely to experience
grievances, (2) better able to mobilize quickly given that they already have organized institutions
in place, and (3) more likely to be restricted in the bargaining capabilities (Mason and Mitchell
2016). Combining the previous models of grievance theories and rational choice, this framework
helps us to examine the puzzle of ethnic and communal conflict more holistically.
Beyond those general arguments of why ethnic conflict is more prominent generally, the
literature has also identified several theories regarding why ethnic conflict occurs within the
context of civil war: primordial, instrumental, constructionist and security dilemma (Oberschall
2010). As previously discussed, the primordial and constructionist identity arguments, suggest
that ethnic identity is either fixed and will inevitably yield conflict or socially constructed (i.e.,
not fixed), but is an important building block of community that can be utilized by both the
members of the group and politicians alike to create ingroups and outgroups when advantageous.
The instrumental theory argues that, unlike the former argument, ethnic identity is formed and
invoked by state powers in order to rally support or accomplish political goals. Finally, the
security dilemma, a popular realist theory of international relations, argues that when a system
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exists in a state of anarchy, or one without central leadership, the actors in the system will be
more likely to act offensively in an attempt to protect themselves from the other preemptively. In
this context, this theory suggests that when the state is collapsing or ineffectual, ethnic groups
will find themselves in competition over resources and power, making conflict significantly
more likely.
Looking more concretely at what communal civil war looks like off the pages of
academic theories, the literature tends to be slightly divided on just how impactful identity is in
navigating the war process. Some studies have shown that, when controlling for per capita
income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience
significant civil violence, indicating fractionalization is not a good predictor of the inception of
civil war, but rather that there are other conditions that trigger war including poverty, political
instability, rough terrain, and large population (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In a similar strain, more
recent scholarship has argued that it is not ethnicity itself, but the interaction of ethnicity and
domestic politics within a state that influence the duration and processes of civil war
(Wucherpfennig et al 2012). This nuanced understanding suggests that ethnic conflicts are not
prolonged due to rigid ethnic loyalties are rigid or increased devotion to the collective campaign
from within the ethnic groups, but rather that intrastate conflicts last longer when they are
infused with ethnonationalist sentiments and grievances (Wucherpfennig et al 2012). Thus, the
politicization of ethnicity and identity as whole is likely the crucial point of interaction in
unpacking how civil war unfolds.
In addition to the complexities of the ethnic civil war interaction, scholars have posited
that interaction likely behaves differently in these conflicts as well, from the decision of a third
party to intervene at all to the outcome of said intervention. In explaining why intervention
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occurs in ethnic wars, scholars have identified both domestic and international factors that
influence the actions of third parties. Domestically, factors such as vulnerability of the warring
parties, ethnic ties, diaspora politics, and regime type have been identified, while the
international factors include the international system’s need to balance or bandwagon a specific
power, regime type norms, socialization, defensive positions on the part of intervening states
(Paquin and Saideman 2008). Additional findings have concluded that high levels of ethnic
dominance and low levels of institutional constraints within the state, coupled with high levels of
ethnic affinity from the third-party increase likelihood of intervention (Carment and James 2000,
Cetinyen 2002). Scholars tend to agree that diaspora politics and ethnic ties from the third party
to a warring party are the key variables impacting the likelihood of intervention, largely on the
assumption that stronger ethnic ties yield stronger rebel groups, lowering the cost of
interventions (Cetinyen 2002). In looking at the outcomes of intervention, studies have suggested
that intervention early on in a conflict can work to mobilize and shape the stances taken by
ethnic groups and can lead to dissenting groups to become more radicalized (Paquin and
Saideman 2008). While it has been established that intervention increases war duration in all
civil war types, this would suggest that this mechanism may have a greater effect in cases of
ethnic or communal civil war.
The literature has consistently found deep complexities in the realm of communal
conflict, with disagreements arising over just about every potential hypothesis from the origin of
ethnic conflict to the best practices in resolving it. While this reveals a clear lack of consensus
among scholars, it also points to a larger issue. Ethnic civil conflict has yet to be studied with
enough depth and nuance to fully understand how it unfolds, how it interacts with other
variables, and how to resolve it.
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Critique of the Literature
While the literature has a vast understanding of civil war and terrorism as separate fields
of study, there has been little research on the manner in which the two interact. We have a robust
theoretical background surrounding the intentions of spoiling, the origins of communal conflict,
and the factors influencing the processes of communally based civil wars, but very little data on
the ways that these variables impact each other as well as the outcomes of the civil conflict.
Many disagreements among academics in this field indicate a clear gap in the research
regarding why different civil wars vary in their processes. Scholars of political violence work
with multiple theories that explain the beginnings of civil war, however, we have very little to
work with when investigating how they end, let alone the conditions that impact the
effectiveness or likelihood of negotiations and peace settlements.
As civil wars continue to be the primary form of global conflict seen today, there is a
serious need to understand why civil wars proceed in the manner that they do. It is crucial to
understand not only why wars begin, but also why the last, what drags them on, and what
methods are effective in reducing war duration. By further investigating the overlap between
civil wars and terrorism, we can begin to answer many important questions regarding the
dynamics of intrastate conflict and develop novel implications for relevant policy to best address
the prevalence of civil wars.
Theory
Over the course of this study, I aim to initiate the closing of two major gaps in the
literature surrounding the processes of ethnic civil wars. First and foremost, I aim to contribute to
the convergence of the fields of civil war and terrorism. Additionally, as the field develops in its
understanding of best practices of resolving intrastate war, it is crucial that we cultivate a
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thorough understanding of the processes and dynamics at work in ethnic civil wars, which have
rapidly become the majority of intrastate wars across the board. Closing these gaps in our
understanding of the overlap between intrastate war and terrorism as well as the dynamics of
ethnic civil wars with allow for a more holistic view of civil war as a whole, particularly as we
think about how to resolve these remarkably pervasive conflicts.
Prior theories of civil war have focused largely either on the inception of the civil conflict
in and of itself or the point at which it ends, often neglecting the processes that can influence the
resolution process. This does not necessarily mean that new theories should be developed to
explain the processes of resolution; on the contrary, I argue that the same theories used to explain
the origins of civil war as a phenomenon can easily apply to the process by which war
culminates - or fails to culminate - in a peaceful resolution.
My argument is based first and foremost in contemporary theories of ethnic saliency that
suggest identity becomes more salient both to groups and to individuals when the society focuses
on that particular identity category. This suggests that identity based categories become more
salient in cases of identity based civil wars than they would be in non-identity based wars. This
saliency would serve to highlight and emphasize the differences between groups that otherwise
may not experience much conflict, resulting in a heightened “us versus them” dynamic within
the warring parties of the conflict. Thus, when faced with spoiling in the midst of an identity
based conflict, we can expect this already heightened awareness of identity to become even more
sensitive and salient. This increased saliency plays into the intersection of two additional theories
that interact to construct my argument: relative deprivation and the security dilemma.
As previously explained, relative deprivation refers to when a group perceives a
discrepancy between what they have and what they should realistically be able to achieve in their
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condition. This theory is largely entangled in the psychology of collective action, suggesting that
the sense of relative deprivation in people creates a feeling of frustration which will grow over
time until ignited by an incident that serves to translate that frustration into outright anger that
can quickly become violent collective action. Ethnic or identity based groups are arguably
especially susceptible to this reaction as they already have the resources, through community
organizations, churches, neighborhoods, etc., to mobilize insurgency. Meanwhile, the security
dilemma refers to the situation that communal groups find themselves in when the government is
ineffectual, forcing them to compete with other groups for resources, power, and safety. This
theory suggests that groups in this situation will find themselves in a positive feedback loop of
conflict, as both sides of the conflict will be acting preemptively and on the offense in efforts to
protect themselves from the “other.” This description of a conflict loop provides a remarkably
successful predictive model for many of the ethnic civil wars seen in the past fifteen years.
Finally, the terrorist strategy of spoiling plays a crucial role in my theoretical argument
based on its ability to reactivate the issues that originally triggered the conflict and
simultaneously exacerbating or reigniting feelings of relative deprivation and the perception of
the security dilemma. The literature has typically focused on the impact that spoiling has on
moderates that are active in the peace process, however, I am suggesting that the effect of any
spoiling event is much broader than just the negotiating table. While the primary goal of a
spoiling party may be to breed distrust among moderates and deter a resolution, the audience of
spoiling is much wider than just a handful of policymakers. The population as a whole is also
witnessing and may even be victim to the spoiling event. This alone suggests that the resulting
distrust and suspicion created by spoiling would be felt much wider than the moderates but
would also affect the population at large. Should this theory hold, a spoiling event should even
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result in civilians being more hesitant to support and uphold any potential peace deal. While the
targets of spoiling might be narrow, the impact ripples into the entire conflict.
I argue that, beyond the explanatory power these two theories have in describing why
civil wars begin, their effects stretch across the course of the war, largely affecting the outcome
of any possible resolution, particularly when we account for the presence of spoiling. The
security dilemma is characterized by a lack of trust for other actors in the system and a strong
incentive to remain armed and on the offensive, factors that would likely be amplified in the
wake of a spoiling incident. Regardless of who the spoiling party is, the occurrence of spoiling
will serve to make all negotiating parties suspicious of their rivals, reinforcing the lack of trust
characterized by the security dilemma and re-emphasizing the relative power and “otherness” of
opposing groups. I argue that this generalized assumption of how spoiling will impact a conflict
becomes much more prevalent in cases of identity based civil war because the heightened
saliency of identity will amplify the effects that spoiling has in reactivating the security dilemma
and the sense of relative deprivation among the general population.
By adapting the theory of relative deprivation and the security dilemma, my argument
holds that ethnic civil wars will be particularly resistant to resolution when spoiling occurs
through a causal sequence that I have referred to as the Polarized Identity hypothesis. This
hypothesis holds that if a civil war can be characterized as identity based, the warring parties will
be more affected by any spoiling event that occurs, resulting in a more durable war that takes
longer to see resolution.
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Figure 2.1 Arrow Diagrams of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: If a civil war can be characterized as identity based, the warring parties will be
more affected by any spoiling event that occurs, resulting in a more durable war that takes longer
to see resolution (Polarized Identity hypothesis).

Hypothesis 2: When a civil war can be characterized as identity based, we can expect that it will
experience spoiling events at a higher frequency than civil wars that are characterized as nonidentity based.
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Based in part on my argument and in part on the existing literature, I believe that spoiling
in non-identity based civil war will not have the same effect in significantly increasing war
duration. While spoiling may impact the peace process in all civil wars, the extent of its impact
should be much lesser in non-identity based wars, given that many of the mechanisms that I
believe trigger the success of spoiling (identity saliency, heightening security dilemma) is not as
present in those cases as they are in identity based wars. Thus, we can expect that non-identity
based civil wars will (a) experience successful spoiling less frequently than identity based civil
wars and (b) will be able to more rapidly return to the peace process if the spoiling is successful
than an identity based civil war would.
The experiences of relative deprivation and the security dilemma in which communal
groups are forced to fend for themselves against opposing groups, have been found to intersect
more frequently in ethnic civil wars (Oberschall 2000; Posen 1993; Regan 1996). The
comorbidity of tension and opposition between polarized identity groups increases the likelihood
that groups will be more defensive and less willing to compromise, even without the influence of
a spoiling party. A spoiler will serve to confirm the suspicions of each combatting group,
decreasing the likelihood of resolution and increasing the duration of the war. The null
hypothesis states that ethnic civil wars do not experience a higher incidence of spoiling which
limits the success of any attempt of resolution, thus, increasing the duration of the affected
conflict.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
In order to thoroughly investigate the questions posed by the Polarized Identity
Hypothesis and by the interaction between civil war and spoiling as a whole, I plan to utilize a
large n study The field of political violence and civil war scholarship have established a general
precedent that the large n study is the primary method of establishing a statistically significant
connection between two variables, further allowing for more theorizing from that baseline. The
large n study has been used vastly as a reliable method of evaluating trends and causal
sequencing across all known wars through objective coding of variables that allows for the
observation of an explanatory variable while also controlling for other variables that may be
unique case to case (Narang 2014; Regan 1996; Sambanis & Elbadawi 2000; Werner 2000). This
methodology also allows for the controlling of other variables to isolate the variables of interest,
further justifying the application of the general results of the study to specific cases, regardless of
most of the other variables at work.
This study will be framed by a civil war-year unit of analysis, looking at the temporal
domain of all years between 1970 and 2014, and a spatial domain of all countries experiencing a
civil war during that time. My population will include all civil wars occurring within this time
period, allowing the study to verify the distinction found in the literature that identity based wars
are more durable and are generally more difficult to resolve than non-identity based civil wars
(Cunningham 2017; Johnson 2015; Sambanis & Elbadawi 2000). By limiting my sample
temporally, I hope to root out most of the internationalized/proxy wars of the Cold War from my
analysis, as their dynamics are significantly different and would not represent a valid test of the
Polarized Identity hypothesis.
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Study Design
Independent Variable
The independent variable in this study is civil war type, coded dichotomously with 1
indicating an identity based civil war, and 0 indicating a non-identity based civil war. Following
much of the literature, civil war will be conceptualized as a conflict occurring within a single
state that involves the state government, can be characterized by effective resistance from both
sides, and amasses at least one thousand battle deaths within a calendar year (Sambanis 2004). I
will be capturing the data for this sample from the Correlates of War Project, namely from the
COW Intra-State War datasets (Sarkees and Dixon 2020).
In order to distinguish between identity and non-identity based conflicts, I will be
supplementing the COW data with the Political Instability Task Force’s State Failure Problem
Set data. This data is composed of several datasets that identify conflicts as ethnic, revolutionary,
regime changes, or genocide. For the purposes of this study, I am conceptualizing identity based
civil war as a conflict that meets the general qualifications of a civil war, but where the conflict
(1) revolves around the opposing identities of communal groups (ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc.
and (2) the parties operate by making claims for the communal group’s collective interest (Regan
1996). Any civil war that does not meet that criteria will be coded as non-identity based. By
relying on multiple datasets and definitions, I hope to make this variable as nuanced and reliable
as possible while also cultivating greater validity in its application to future studies.
Conditional Variable
The presence of spoiling within the civil wars is a conditional variable in my model,
coded 1 for presence and 0 for absence of a spoiling event, regardless of which party was the
“spoiler.” In order to fully capture the impact of spoiling, I will also be collecting data on how
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many spoiling events took place over the course of each conflict, as well as within each countryyear. Once again relying on the literature, I will be conceptualizing spoiling as “various forms of
behavior, such as terrorism,” which aim to “negatively affect the course and the outcome of the
peace process” (Findely & Young 2015). Data on spoiling events will be retrieved directly from
the data of Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2018). As the most expansive terrorism database,
the GTD has been used rigorously in the literature, establishing legitimacy and ensuring that my
captured data will be consistent with other studies on the subject.
In order to ensure the events analyzed are capturing the form of terrorism that I aim to
study, I searched the database for each country experiencing civil conflict, for every year of the
conflict. Events that I coded as spoiling were those that were targeted at the government, whether
general or diplomatic, military, non-state militias, and violent political parties. These parameters
were meant to isolate terrorism events that would have an impact on the trust between warring
parties consistent with the literature’s understanding of spoiling. While this method of data
collection will likely result in a somewhat conservative perspective regarding the amount of
spoiling occurring from case to case, it should provide a sufficient examination of the variables
to yield a strong conclusion regarding the role spoiling plays in the relationship between civil
war type and duration.
Dependent Variable
As previously mentioned, the dependent variable of interest here is the duration of civil
war. The most straightforward variable within this model, this variable examines how long a
civil war endures from start to finish, as well as how long the conflict endures after a spoiling
event. Relying again on the precedent set by Findely and Young, the duration of war will be
operationalized through two measures. First, will be the end of civil war, coded for each year
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with a 1 when civil war ends, and a 0 when it does not. Second, is the measure of war recurrence,
which will also be measured dichotomously with a 1 when war recurred and 0 when it did not. I
coded a war as recurring if it appeared to be a continuation of a prior conflict, involving the same
actors, issues and war type. Both measures of this variable will be captured through the data from
the Correlates of War Interstate War dataset.
Controls
Based on the control variables of similar studies, I will be controlling for population,
GDP per capita, ethnic and cultural diversity, foreign intervention, regime type, number of
parties to the war, history of civil conflict, and neighboring violence.
Data on population by year will be drawn from the World Population Growth dataset
developed by Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, spanning from 1800 to
2019. This dataset offers the most expansive measures of population across time, drawing from
Gapminder data, HYDE, and UN Population Division estimates, yielding a reliable and broadly
accepted measure. Similarly, I will be drawing data measuring GDP per capita from the World
Bank spanning from 1960 to 2019. Sourced from the World Bank national accounts data and the
OECD National Accounts data, this dataset has amassed broad credibility and reliability across
academics of political science as well as countless other fields. Given the disruptive nature of
conflict, there are some small gaps in this data for states at war, given that it was not possible to
capture economic data for those years. While this does weaken the control, I believe that the
rigor of the controls I have included should minimize the effect.
Unlike the uniform acceptance of the aforementioned sources, scholars of political
violence vary widely in their measure of diversity. Ethnic fractionalization has proved difficult
even to define, let alone to universally measure. Given the context and purposes of my study, I
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aimed to capture the most holistic view of diversity possible, and I will be utilizing James D.
Fearon’s appendix of ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity scores (2003). Supplementing
data from the Atlas Narodov Mira with a novel index of ethnic fractionalization, Fearon
developed two separate scores for each state, one for ethnic fractionalization and one for cultural
fractionalization. Scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating complete homogeneity. This dataset
was constructed in 2002 and captured this measure at that point in time, so I will not be able to
vary the measure from year to year. While a year-by-year measure would be ideal, the literature
suggests that ethnic fractionalization tends to be slow changing; given that this particular ELF
measure comes from the approximate median of my temporal boundary, I believe that it should
be sufficient as a control in the context of my study. While this remains an imperfect measure,
this report aims to ground the conceptualization and operationalization of diversity in the
groupings that are apparent within states, offering a more robust measure as a result.
Data on regime type will come from the Polity Project’s Polity5 data on political regime
characteristics (Marshall 2020). Spanning from 1800 to 2018, this dataset assigns scores based
on the level of democracy and autocracy, as well as a composite score from 10 to -10,
representing absolute democracy and absolute autocracy respectively. This source has been
largely accepted in the study of international relations and comparative politics as a reliable and
valid measure of regime type. Similar to the measure of GDP, there are small gaps in the
collected data regarding certain state’s regime type. I will be filling these gaps by averaging the
regime score of surrounding years in order to compensate for this data loss.
For the sake of consistency, the measures of foreign intervention, and history of war will
all be drawn from the Correlates of War Intra-State War and State Participants datasets. Foreign
intervention will be measured dichotomously, with 0 indicating no intervention or
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internationalization. A state’s history of war will be a simply dichotomous variable, with 0 and 1
representing presence and absence respectively. For the purposes of this study, I was interested
only in a relatively recent history of civil conflict; therefore, history of civil war was only coded
as 1 if a prior civil conflict had occurred in that state from the beginning of the 20th century
onward.
Data for the number of warring parties and neighboring violence will be pulled from the
Uppsala Conflict Data Project. The number of warring parties will be a simple count variable
based on the involved parties identified in the dataset for each war by year of the conflict. While
the measure of warring parties is an imperfect one, especially for more internationalized conflicts
that make it more difficult to determine exactly how many actors are involved, this dataset will
offer the closest approximation that will remain consistent with the data for the population of
civil wars in this study. Finally, the variable of neighboring violence will be dichotomous, with 0
and 1 representing presence and absence respectively. This variable is designed to capture any
type of intrastate violence occurring in states directly on the border of the state at war, based on
the assumption that any neighboring violence could have major impacts on the domestic politics
within the state.
The data sources utilized for all the aforementioned variables have been widely used
throughout previous studies in the civil war literature, and thus have established credibility in the
field. Particularly, by using the data established by a previous study focused on civil war and
spoiling, I can be sure that I am looking at the same cases that have already been used to
successfully establish causal connections within the same variables I am examining. Given that
there is no single data source that captures spoiling, I have worked to ensure that my method of
capturing and coding spoiling is as straightforward and reliable as possible. By relying on data
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already established within the literature, I believe that this study will yield valid and reliable
results that can be replicated in the future.
Datasets
Given the complexity and ambiguity of the relationships at play here, I wanted to ensure
that my data would be robust enough to capture any and all possible correlations. The literature
examines the impact of spoiling almost exclusively as it relates to specific moments of
negotiations or developing peace treaties, limiting the scope of study to the immediate effect of a
single event (Findley & Young 2015). While this previous scope of study is undoubtedly
valuable in the context of the literature on terrorism, my question is interested less in the
immediate impact of spoiling and more concerned with the way that spoiling impacts the broader
dynamics and mechanisms of civil wars over their full duration. In my work to address my
question and hypotheses, I need to examine the dynamics of wars not only immediately as
spoiling occurs, but also in their entirety. In order to best accomplish this, I plan to develop two
datasets that will allow me to examine the variables at two critical units of analysis.
My first dataset, titled duration, will examine all civil wars with their onset between 1970
and 2014 with a conflict unit of analysis. In this dataset, duration will be measured as a count
reflecting the total number of civil war years; the coding for war type will be dichotomous while
spoiling will have both a dichotomous measure of presence as well as a count measure reflecting
the approximate total number of spoiling events across the conflict as a whole. Given that this
dataset will not examine the conflicts year by year, some of my control variables will not be
applicable, as they vary considerably from year to year and an average of the total years would
not yield a meaningful representation of the variable. The controls included in this dataset will be
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ethnolinguistic fractionalization, measured on a scale of 0 to 1, and intervention, history of civil
war, and neighboring violence, which are dichotomous measures of presence or absence.
My second dataset, titled interaction, will look more closely at the variations in conflict
dynamics in real time. This dataset will examine the same civil wars identified in the previous
data at the country-year unit of analysis. Unlike the previous dataset, however, duration of war
will need to be measured at a dichotomous variable rather than account. Here I’ll employ the
durability measure, which will look at whether a war was durable within that particular year with
1 indicating a durable conflict and 0 indicating that the war was no longer durable. The coding of
war type and spoiling will remain the same, with the slight distinction that the number of
spoiling events will now only refer to those occurring within the specific year. Furthermore, this
unit of analysis will allow for the inclusion of all my previously set control variables.
Empirical Analysis
To achieve the maximum robustness in the context of this study, I will be employing
several statistical models to illustrate the relationships of interest. First, I will be looking at the
correlational relationships between all the variables within my duration dataset in order to gain
familiarity with the data and examine any immediate trends or correlations of interest. This will
also begin to give me an idea of the kind of relationship at play between war type, spoiling and
duration. Following this initial look at the data, I will be employing a series of count model
regression in order to establish a link between spoiling and total war duration. These models will
allow me to examine the impact that war type and spoiling have on the duration of civil wars,
both as individual variables and as they interact, while also allowing me to look at the impact of
both the presence and amount of spoiling. I will also be utilizing a chi-square test to examine
whether there is a correlation between civil war type and the likelihood of spoiling. While this is
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not necessary for my argument, this connection would allow for a more holistic discussion of the
interaction between civil war type, spoiling, and war duration.
After establishing the general relationship at play, I will be utilizing a survival model
with a country-year unit of analysis in order to fully examine the causal direction of the
relationships between the variables of interest. This model will measure the effect of spoiling
based on whether or not the conflict ends in the year following the spoiling event. Duration will
be a lagged and dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating the end of conflict and 1 indicating
either a continued conflict or the recurrence of conflict that had ceased.
Limitations of Study
While I have attempted to ensure that all the variables in this study are comprehensive
and thoroughly operationalized, the ambiguity of many of these concepts is the greatest
limitation of this study. The criteria for many of these variables, including identity based war and
spoiling, is still largely disputed among experts in the field and it continues to be a challenge to
find the best practices in capturing these variables. The field has evolved and continues to
develop better ways to think about and capture our variables of interest. I have attempted to
incorporate all the best practices in this study, maximizing the reliability of my measures and
striving for as much external validity as possible.
Another major limitation is the ambiguity that comes with understanding the mechanisms
of civil war in general. With consistent disagreements in the literature regarding many aspects of
the way that civil wars begin, develop, and end, it is hard to say with any certainty that this study
will result in an understanding of how factors cause conflict or prevent its resolution.
Additionally, the vague nature of many of my variables results in some difficulty in just coding
them consistently. Given the novelty of spoiling, both as a concept and as a measurable variable,
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there is a significant likelihood that I may not be capturing the full extent of what the literature
would conceptualize as spoiling. This ambiguity of operationalization also makes it difficult
when it comes to controlling for certain factors, such as foreign backed civil war and
internationalization. My hope is that this study will at the very least be able to indicate the
direction and significance of certain relationships that can then be further developed and better
understood with additional study in the future.
Overall, it may be difficult for this study to immediately offer concrete, predictive
findings that can be applied to policy or to pre-existing questions in the field; however, I believe
that it has the potential to cultivate support for a theory that may provide a more comprehensive
view of how identity based wars evolve and function differently. Even if the results of this study
do not offer support for the Polarized Identity hypothesis, they will offer us insight into the
factors at work in extending war duration and begin to broaden our understanding of the overlap
between specific types of terrorism and civil war.
Expectations
The focus of this study revolves very closely around the success of spoiling in mitigating
the resolution of civil war. Overall, I expect to find that parties to identity based civil wars
experience a more potent effect of spoiling than their non-identity based counterparts. To reject
my hypothesis, I would need to see spoiling having no effect or having a uniform effect across
all civil war types in terms of the duration of the war or the recurrence of war, indicating that
there is another variable causing the effect.
These prospective findings would open up several new questions for further
investigation, namely how negotiating parties should navigate in the wake of a spoiling event in
order to reduce its impact, regardless of the war type. This study presents an opportunity to close

36

this glaring gap in the literature, allowing the field to more comprehensively understand the
processes of how civil wars end, and how civil wars interact with the broader phenomenon of
terrorism. I believe that this study will begin to uncover the missing piece of the long-standing
puzzle in the field of political violence of how we go about ending such bloody, costly conflicts.
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis
Introduction
To briefly review my methodological approach and my hypothesis, I will utilize a large-n
quantitative regression analysis to assess the potential relationship between extended duration in
identity based civil wars and spoiling. Based on the scholarship within the study of civil war and
terrorism, my hypothesis follows that the effect of spoiling events on the duration of civil wars
will be greater in identity based civil wars than in non-identity based wars. I will begin by
running a few basic tests to describe the data and identify significant correlations between
variables. Then, I will justify my selection of a negative binomial regression model to test the
data at the conflict unit of analysis, interpret the subsequent results, and discuss some of the
implications these results will have on my hypothesis. Finally, I will utilize a hazard model to
investigate the country-year unit of analysis, interpret the results, and evaluate my overall
findings in relation to my hypothesis.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Within my temporal limitation of 1970 to 2014 imposed by the available data in the GTD
and the Correlates of War project, the study consisted of 147 observations with a unit of analysis
of civil war. Table 4.1 depicts the full descriptive statistics for this initial dataset. Identity based
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wars made up a slight majority, with 84 identity based and 63 non-identity based wars (see Table
4.2). Duration, measured by year, showed an incredibly wide range, with several conflicts such
as the Black September War in 1970 or the Hama Uprising in 1982 lasting less than a year and
conflicts including the Angolan Control War and the Mozambique War lasting over forty years.
The average duration sat at around 4.5 years, akin to the Anti-Khomeini Coalition War, the First
Sri Lankan Tamil War, and the Second Burundi War.

It is also worthwhile to note that several of the conflicts observed appear brief, but recur
consistently over time, as is the case for Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. These conflicts are each coded separately for these initial models, meaning that they are
appearing here as shorter conflicts, when that may not necessarily be the case. These recurring
conflicts will be of particular interest for analysis in the context of the hazard model as I can
observe recurrence as a dependent variable in addition to duration.
Contrary to my initial assumption, spoiling appears to be increasingly common across all
civil wars regardless of war type, with 124 of the observed conflicts experiencing at least one
instance of spoiling. A simple test of correlations found no significant connection between war
type and spoiling or the number of spoiling events (Table 4.3). Much like the measure of
duration, the number of spoiling incidents per conflict varied widely with a maximum of 3,241
spoiling incidents and an average of 151 incidents per conflict. This measure, however, may not
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be the most reliable for regression style analyses, given that it reflects the number of spoiling
events as static; thus, the longer a conflict lasts, there becomes more time available for spoiling
to occur. While I will be using this measure of spoiling briefly at the conflict unit of analysis, I
believe that analysis of the number of spoiling events will be much more meaningful and valid at
the country-year unit of analysis.

Table 4.3 depicts the correlations between all the variables that are applicable to the
conflict unit of analysis, including war type as the independent variable, spoiling as an
intervening variable, duration in years as the dependent variable, and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (ELF), intervention, history of war, and neighboring violence as controls.
Following the expectations of the literature, duration seems to be positively correlated with the
presence of spoiling, the number of spoiling events, etho-linguistic fractionalization, and
intervention (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Cunningham 2017). While not within the
realm of focus for this study, the results also show a significant positive correlation between war
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type and intervention, as well as with neighboring violence. This could indicate a transnational
element of identity based wars that may warrant further study.
To more substantively analyze this data, I used a Chi² test for the relationship between
war type and spoiling occurrence using the dichotomous measure of both variables. There
appears to be no significant correlation between identity based conflicts and the occurrence of
spoiling. Combined with the data on spoiling showing widespread occurrence across civil wars,
these findings suggest that spoiling events may be a part of the general civil war process rather
than significant indicators of the war’s status or severity (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Chi Square Analysis

Binomial Regression Analysis
Given the operationalization of variables in this dataset, an event count model should be
utilized to analyze the data in full. Within the data of interest, there are no relevant negative
values to capture given that zero is the lowest number of years in a conflict or of the number of
spoiling events taking place. Additionally, the nature of my data can be expected to divert from
linear assumptions, as the hurdle between 0 and 1 spoiling event is much larger than between 10
to 11 events. With this in mind, I can rule out an Ordinary Least Squares regression, as it would
include negative values and would inhibit an accurate interpretation of my results (Krain 1997).
Similarly, I can rule out the use of a Poisson regression, as it assumes that the events represented
by the dependent variable are occurring independently of each other (Krain 1997). Within the
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context of civil war, each year is certainly not happening in a vacuum and undoubtedly cannot be
considered an independent event; the presence of a civil war within one year is largely
influenced by the presence of a civil war in the previous year and will, in the same vein, impact
the likelihood of civil war in the following year. In brief, while the duration of conflict is
measured as a count variable, we know that each year of a civil war is not occurring
independently of others in the war, or even of years prior to and following the conflict as a
whole; therefore, a Poisson regression would also be inappropriate for this analysis. All this
considered, a negative binomial model is the most fitting event count regression for this
particular analysis.
The variables of interest here are war type, spoiling, and the duration of the civil war;
specifically, I am interested in the effects that war type and spoiling have on duration. I began
with a standard negative binomial regression to investigate the straightforward relationship
between war type and the dichotomous measure of spoiling in Model A (see Table 4.5). Unlike
other regression models, the coefficient outputs of a negative binomial cannot be interpreted as a
one-to-one unit increase across variables. Rather significant coefficients must first be multiplied
by the sample mean of the dependent variable, and then can be interpreted normally. Model A
found that, while war type did not have a significant effect on duration, the coefficient of
spoiling was significant, with a probability less than 0.001. Applying the aforementioned
formula to interpret the coefficient, this model found that, when spoiling occurs within a civil
war, the duration of the war was extended by 5.062 years.
With this in mind, I ran an additional regression (Model B) with the count measure of
spoiling to establish whether or not the relationship held. Once again, no significant relationship
was found between war type and the duration of war, however, the number of spoiling events
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remained significant with a p-value of 0.003. Converting the coefficient suggests that war
duration is increased by 0.003 years for each single incident of spoiling. This finding implies
that, while single instances of spoiling may not have outstanding impacts on war duration,
repeated acts of spoiling could be of particular interest to investigate further to better understand
the impact that this form of terrorism has on civil conflicts.
To illustrate this relationship more tangibly, let’s look back to what the descriptive data
told us about the frequency of spoiling events across civil wars. A civil war that experiences 1
spoiling event may not be significantly impacted, with the duration extended by only 0.003
years. However, my descriptive statistic suggested that the average number of spoiling events
within a conflict is approximately 151. This suggests that the average civil war would have its
duration extended by almost half a year (.003 * 151 = 0.453 years), and a conflict that
experiences 574 spoiling events, which is only one standard deviation above the mean would
have its duration extend by nearly two years (.003 * 574 = 1.722 years).
Finally, my last negative binomial model targeted the interaction between war type and
the presence of spoiling in order to exhaust all analytical methods of investigating this
relationship. Once again, I used the dichotomous measure of spoiling and constructed an
interaction variable, wartype#spoiling, to conduct this regression. Much like the previous two
models, Model C found that the coefficient of spoiling was significant to duration (p=0.004) and
that war type had no significant effect. Interestingly, the interaction variable also showed no
statistical significance, with a p-value of 0723.
These results are particularly interesting, as they suggest that the civil war type has no
significant impact on the overall duration of the war. Rather, the presence of spoiling seems to be
the most useful variable in projecting the potential duration of a conflict. Contrary to my
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Polarized Identity hypothesis, the current analysis would suggest that spoiling has the same
effect on conflict, regardless of conflict entanglements across identities.
Table 4.5 Binomial Regression Models

As mentioned earlier in this section, the nature of many of the variables at work may not
be best represented under this particular unit of analysis. By shifting to a country-year unit of
analysis, I will be able to capture more of the nuance and complexity of the relationships at play,
incorporating duration as a year-by-year measure and accounting for wars that recur over time.
This will allow for a closer investigation of the impact of spoiling as it occurs and the impact that
spoiling has as it fluctuates over time.
Survival Model
While the regression analyses of the previous section yielded significant insights on the
validity of the Polarized Identity hypothesis, there are still significant questions remaining
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regarding the precise nature of the effect that spoiling has across civil wars. As previously
mentioned, this is in part due to the nature of my original unit of analysis. There is significant
value in examining the dynamics at the level of the conflict, however, by isolating each conflict
the analysis is rendered unable to capture the complicated and cyclical nature of civil wars within
a state. The recurrence of a war and its year-by-year duration allow for a closer examination into
civil war dynamics and their impacts in real time.
With these stipulations in mind, this larger analysis relied on a country-year unit of
analysis, resulting in 555 observed units between 1970 and 2014. As with the last model, I
included the control variables of ELF, intervention, history of civil conflict, and neighboring
violence, with the addition of GDP per capita, population, regime type, and the number of parties
to the war. The measures of spoiling also remain consistent, with a dichotomous measure
indicating the presence or absence of spoiling within that country-year, and a count variable
indicating the estimated number of events that occurred within that country-year.
Unlike the previous count models, this larger analysis will allow for a closer examination
of the relationships between my variables of interest as they covary in real time. Rather than
examine conflict duration overall, this analysis will utilize a dichotomous measure of duration,
where 1 represents a year of durable conflict and 0 represents that the conflict was no longer
durable, or the conflict ended within that year. This will allow me to examine the effects of
spoiling in real time rather than relying on speculation. I will be utilizing a similar measure with
the additional dependent variable of war recurrence, where a 1 indicates that the conflict
beginning in that country year is a recurrence of a previous conflict rather than a “new” war and
a 0 indicates an entirely novel conflict. This variable is primarily relevant to the first year of a
conflict, whereas the durability variable will be relevant across every unit.
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Table 4.6: Country-Year Descriptive Statistics

As with the previous analysis, a simple test of correlations across the variables shows no
significant correlation between war type and spoiling or between war type and the number of
spoiling events, further strengthening the evidence against the Polarized Identity hypothesis. As
would be expected, war type was significantly positively correlated with ELF, intervention and
the number of parties to the war, suggesting that many of the general assumptions along the
literature of ethnicity and civil war hold. Interestingly, there does not seem to be a correlation
between the dichotomous measure of spoiling and durability, whereas durability is positively
correlated with the number of spoiling events that occurs. This further strengthens the
assumption suggested by the negative binomial regression model, that it is the magnitude of
spoiling rather than simply the presence of spoiling that has a significant impact on civil war.
Finally, it does not appear that war type, the presence of spoiling, nor the number of spoiling
events are significantly correlated with war recurrence, leaving significant questions regarding
the role of recurring conflicts within this paradigm.
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In order to delve deeper into this data, I will be utilizing a Cox proportional hazard model
focused on the impact that civil war characteristics have on conflict durability and recurrence.
The hazard model looks to examine the “failure” of a variable, or the point at which a variable
changes states. Within the context of this study, I am looking to examine the way that war type
and spoiling in particular impact duration and recurrence over time; however, given the
distinctions between the two dependent variables, I will be defining “failure” slightly differently
to best reflect what is occurring within the data.
In looking at duration, failure will be coded as 0, when a war is no longer durable. This
will allow me to pinpoint the year at which the impact of spoiling ceases to extend the duration
of the conflict. However, because the model calculates the z-scores based on the connection of
the variables to the failure which is coded as 0, with non-failure coded as 1, we can expect
correlations to be inversely represented by the calculated z-score, with a positive z-score
indicates a negative correlation and negative z-score indication positive correlation. For example,
if war type were to elicit a z-score of -3.00, this would indicate a significant positive relationship
between war type and duration; war type would have a significant impact on the likelihood that
the war will continue to be durable from one year to the next, decreasing the probability of
reaching a 0 for duration in the following year. Unlike duration, the failure indicator for
recurrence is coded as a 1, allowing for the interpretation of the statistical calculation to be
conducted as usual, with z-scores representing the accurate directions of any potential
correlations.
Beginning with the dependent variable of durability, I first ran a model that looked only
at the variables of interest: war type, spoiling, and the number of spoiling events (see Table 4.8).
As alluded by previous analyses, war type does not appear to have a statistically significant

48

correlation with durability year by year, however, both spoiling and the number of spoiling
events showed a very significant positive correlation. Once again, this indicates that when
spoiling occurs in a conflict, the likelihood of the conflict being durable over the next year
increases. I repeated this model with the addition of the aforementioned control variables with no
significant changes occurring in the results. This tells us that the relationship between durability
and spoiling is significant and influential even when all other factors are accounted for, further
strengthening the collection of evidence against the Polarized Identity hypothesis.
Turning to the recurrence variable, I followed the same course of action in order to assess
the relationships at work here (Table 4.9). I began first by running the model with just the
variables of war type and my two measures of spoiling. As expected, war type does not appear to
be significant to the recurrence of civil war, however, this model deviated from the previous
analyses in that the presence of spoiling also shows no statistical significance. The number of
spoiling events appears to be slightly statistically significant, with a negative correlation.
Contrary to the relationship found between spoiling and duration, it seems that an increase in
spoiling events is decreasing the likelihood of recurring war.
Interestingly, when the control variables are included in the recurrence model, the
findings flip (see Table 4.9). While war type remains insignificant, the presence of spoiling
becomes the significant variable, and the number of events is no longer statistically significant.
The direction of this relationship remains negative, suggesting that spoiling decreases the
likelihood of recurring conflict at least to some extent. However, the nature of the contrary
results certainly suggests that there may be other mechanisms at work when it comes to the
recurrence of civil war, indicating a need for significant additional study to fully understand this
relationship.

49

50

51

Case Discussions
Following the theoretical frameworks pre-existing in the civil war literature, I put forth
two separate hypotheses regarding the relationship between war type, spoiling and civil war
duration. In the Polarized Identity hypothesis, the primary theory of the study, I predicted that
spoiling would act within civil wars as a conditional variable that would extend the duration of
identity based civil wars significantly longer than non-identity based wars. In my secondary
hypothesis, I predicted that identity based civil wars would experience spoiling at a significantly
higher frequency than non-identity based wars. While this hypothesis was less important to the
theoretical argument of the Polarized Identity hypothesis, it sought to address the prominent gap
in the overlapping civil war and terrorism literatures which have neglected to fully examine the
interaction of civil conflict and spoiling.
Upon the completion of a full quantitative analysis of correlations, regressions and hazard
models, the results provide strong evidence against both of these hypotheses. First and foremost,
that data suggests that spoiling occurs indiscriminately across civil war types with neither type
experiencing significantly more spoiling events than the other. This suggests that spoiling may
be a part of the civil war process that has yet to be identified and thoroughly studied.
Additionally, the analysis consistently showed that spoiling alone was significantly correlated
with extended war duration, while war type and the interaction of the two variables had no
significant impact. Given the robustness of the analysis and the consistency of results, my
findings suggest that the interaction between civil war type and spoiling is not significant to the
war’s duration, conclusively rejecting the Polarized Identity hypothesis.
In light of these unexpected results, I wanted to employ a brief discussion of particularly
interesting cases in order to fully illustrate the conclusion of my findings. My theoretical
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framework relied heavily on literature surrounding the security dilemma and ethnic saliency,
arguing that acts of spoiling would have a greater impact on the war dynamics within identity
based wars on account of increasing salience of identity heightening the security dilemma
between warring parties. Contrary to this assumption, it would seem that the effect of spoiling is
rather uniform across wars regardless of type, indicating that either the security dilemma is
equally activated in all war types or the security dilemma may not have a profound impact on the
dynamics of civil wars over time. To better illustrate this relationship and begin to look at the
way the security dilemma and spoiling interact in civil wars, I will be employing a brief
comparative discussion of two prominent conflicts, the recurring Lebanese Civil War and the
FARC/ELN War in Colombia. This discussion will begin with a brief overview of the context
and dynamics of each conflict followed by a look at what the data tells us about what these very
different civil wars seem to have in common.
Broadly understood as an identity based conflict that spanned decades with periods of
cessation followed by recurrence, the Lebanese Civil War serves as one of the most extreme
examples of a conflict within a longstanding sectarian society (Ghosn & Khoury 2011). While
the conflict formally began in 1975, the seeds of war were planted decades earlier within the
structures of the French Mandate and the subsequent government following Lebanese
independence. The partition of the Levant under Mandate would leave Lebanon a cluster of
ethnic and religious identities without the structure in place to effectively and equitably govern.
The primary attempt to establish representative governance came in the National Pact of 1943,
wherein leaders relied on the 1932 census which showed the population evenly split between
Muslims and Christians, resulting in an allocation of all state positions across confessional lines
with the top three positions assigned respectively to a Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a
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Sh’ia Muslim (Ghosn & Khoury 2011). Despite a seemingly equitable division of power, this
arrangement coupled with the growing generational wealth associated with Maronites in
Lebanon and Sunni Muslims across the Middle East as a whole resulted in deep rooted sectarian
beliefs that drastically weakened the state overall (Ghosn & Khoury 2011; Salloukh 2019).
Growing domestic tensions related to power sharing, economic inequality, and sectarian
exploitation combined with regional tensions relating to the neighboring Israeli-Palestinian
conflict came to a staggering head with the outbreak of war in April of 1975. The fifteen years of
conflict were characterized by shifting internal tensions associated with several warring groups
(South Lebanese Army, the Unification and Liberation Front, Hezbollah, the Palestinian
Liberation Front, etc.) that made it near impossible to resolve given the constant competition
over the war front (O’Ballance 1998). Countless attempts of mediated resolution involving the
United Nations, the Arab League, Syria and the United States fell short of ending the conflict
until the Taif Accords in 1989 (Ghosn & Khoury 2011). This resolution resulted in the
Lebanon’s Second Republic which redistributed power equally between Christian and Muslim
communities and worked to roll back confessionalism with varying degrees of success noted by
scholars.
In stark contrast to the Lebanese conflict, Colombia’s civil war is defined by a lack of
any ethnic, regional or religious cleavages within the conflict, but rather by a heaving history of
political violence between political parties (Restrepo et al 2004). Unlike the traditional
conception of civil wars, this war is characterized by conflict between the institutional
government which is supported by the vast majority of the population and an extremist minority
that particularly victimizes civilians in isolated and poor areas of the countryside (Restrepo et al
2004).
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Conflict within the country dates back to the 1940s, relating largely to the colonial
history of the state and disputes regarding land distribution. The formal beginning of the civil
war came about in the 1980s when partisan guerrillas shifted away from the proxy conflicts of
the Cold War and transformed themselves into established guerrilla groups that opposed the
conservative government (Steele & Schubiger 2018). Two primary forces rose quickly, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),
with the severity of conflict ebbing and flowing over the decades. Conflict largely intensified in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, accelerating into the early 2000s before beginning to decline in
severity up into the present day. While the war remains ongoing, it has continued to proceed at
low intensity despite a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC 2016
(Steele & Schubiger 2018).
These cases reflect the wide variety of characteristics that we can expect to see in cases of
durable and recurring conflicts, with Lebanon clearly representing a case of identity based
conflict, while Colombia offers insight into a non-identity based civil war. Under the
assumptions of the Polarized Identity hypothesis, we would expect that Lebanon should have
experienced a heightened effect of spoiling, thus lengthening the duration of the conflict, to a
greater extent than the Colombian conflict; however, the results of the quantitative analysis
suggest that this would not be the case. By taking a closer look at these two cases which so
clearly distinguish themselves by war type, I expect to gain a better understanding of how the
mechanism of spoiling works across civil wars uniformly, rather than disproportionately
impacting identity based war

55

Table 4.10 Case Statistics: Colombia and Lebanon

Given the available data, the capacity of my dataset to capture the full length of these
conflicts was significantly limited. With the sources available, I compiled data on the Colombian
conflict over the course of nearly 27 years, spanning from 1988 to 2014 and capturing 1,452
spoiling events within that time frame. The case of the Lebanese civil war proved more
challenging in its analysis, as the Correlates of War Civil War dataset identified the conflict not
as a single war across time, but as four brief civil wars. This is likely due to the COW definition
of civil war requiring at least 1,000 battle deaths within a calendar year, which would result in
coding an absence of war in years of lower intensity conflict, despite no actual resolution
(Sarkees 2010). In order to maintain the consistency of results with the prior analyses, I will be
working only with the years of data drawn from the COW project regarding Lebanon. With these
limitations in mind, the data reflects nearly 11 years of on and off conflict in Lebanon spanning
from 1975 to 1990 with a total of 463 spoiling events.
As seen in Table 4.10, both cases had a history of civil war, neighboring violence, and
experienced comparable levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The primary points of
divergence are in war type, as previously discussed, and in intervention, with Lebanon
experiencing significant foreign intervention while Colombia has not. With respect to this study,
the primary point of comparison that I am interested in is the rate at which spoiling is occurring
and the impact that spoiling had on the duration of the conflict. Table 4.11 explores this further,
looking specifically at the mean number of spoiling events per year in each respective conflict.
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The average events are about 53.778 and 66.143 for Colombia and Lebanon respectively.
Despite the characteristic differences in these wars, there does not seem to be a notable
difference in the amount of spoiling that occurs.
Table 4.11 Mean Spoiling per Year: Colombia and Lebanon

In order to conclusively establish that the rates of spoiling are uniform across these
conflicts, I ran a difference of means t-test in order to establish statistical significance using the
standard two sample test at 32 degrees of freedom. In order for the difference in the mean
number of spoiling events to be considered significant, the calculated t value would need to reach
or exceed the critical value, 2.037, which is determined by the degrees of freedom and the
significance level of 0.05. The test yielded a t value of -0.5315, indicating no significant
difference in the number of spoiling events occurring in these conflicts per year, with the full
calculations of the test shown in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12 Difference of Means t-Test

These two cases demonstrate first and foremost that the rate at which spoiling is
occurring seems to be consistent across vastly different civil wars. While it is difficult to
statistically establish the impact that spoiling is having on the duration of these wars with the
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data I have, it is worth noting that war type does not seem to be a driving force in the duration of
these particular wars. The durations of both wars extend beyond the first standard deviation of
civil war duration established in Table 1.1, with no reason to suggest that the interaction of war
type is having any significant impact on the durability of these conflicts. In light of the prior
quantitative results, these cases further support the rejection of the Polarized Identity hypothesis
and suggest that spoiling has a larger role to play in the civil war process than the literature
presents.
Results
Over the course of this chapter, my goal was to delve into the available data regarding
civil wars and spoiling in order to establish the existence of any significant relationships between
the dynamics of civil war, the occurrence of spoiling and the duration of war. As spelled out in
the Polarized Identity hypothesis, I expected to find a significant correlation between the
interaction of identity based civil wars and spoiling, with spoiling impact those wars more than
non-identity based wars. I additionally speculated that identity based wars would experience
spoiling at a high frequency that non-identity based wars.
To begin, I looked at the data from 1970 to 2014 with a conflict unit of analysis in order
to examine the correlations between these variables and the overall duration of the conflict. An
initial look at the data showed that, rather than being a rare occurrence, spoiling is a rather
widespread component of civil wars. Additionally, there appeared to be no significant correlation
between the war type and the frequency of spoiling. A look at the correlation to duration found
that war type was also not significantly correlated, but spoiling did have a significant positive
relationship with overall conflict duration.
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To investigate these initial findings further, I utilized a negative binomial regression
analysis to look at the interaction between war type and spoiling. Consistent with prior results,
war type was found to have no significant relationship with war duration, while spoiling was
positively correlated with duration. The number of spoiling events appeared to be particularly
important in determining the magnitude of effect that spoiling would have on duration, with the
impact increasing with every additional spoiling event. The regression also found no significance
to the interaction variable created to look at the interaction between war type and spoiling,
suggesting that it is spoiling alone that is driving the relationship with duration.
Given these results, I expanded the data in order to examine these variables of interest at
the country-year unit of analysis, thus allowing me to examine the relationship between spoiling
and war progression in real time. I employed the use of a Cox proportional hazard model in order
to examine the likelihood that a war would continue to be durable each year, depending on
whether or not spoiling occurred. Consistent with the findings of the negative binomial
regression, the presence of spoiling events and the number of spoiling events were consistently
positively correlated with durability while war type appeared to have no significant effects.
Finally, in order to illustrate these results more concretely, I examined the context and
data on two significant cases within the study: the Lebanese Civil War and the FARC/ELN War
in Colombia. These two civil wars arose in situations that are diametrically opposed, with
Lebanon clearly presenting as an identity based conflict entrenched in longstanding sectarianism
and religious divisions whereas Colombia’s conflict arose out of political and economic strife,
with no interplay of identity in the conflict. In examining the data available on these cases, it
appears that there is no significant difference in the amount of spoiling occurring in either of
these wars, indicating that there likely is no significant relationship with war type and the
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frequency of spoiling. Additionally, we can see that the duration of these war likely is not linked
to identity, given that both conflicts exceed the first standard deviation of overall civil war
duration and the Colombian civil war lasts exceptionally longer despite being a non-identity
based conflict.
Given the robustness and consistency of these results, I can conclusively reject both of
the hypotheses presented in this study. First and foremost, the frequency of spoiling does not
seem to have any significant relationship with war type; rather spoiling seems to be occurring
uniformly across civil wars, regardless of other variables. Additionally, the interaction between
war type and spoiling has been consistently shown to have no statistically significant effect on
the duration of war or on the likelihood of a war recurring. Despite the conclusive findings going
against the original hypothesis, the results of this study raise several crucial questions regarding
our understanding of terrorism as a component of civil war and the role that it plays in the
duration of contemporary civil conflicts.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Discussion of Findings
I began this study with the intention of beginning to close the gap within political
violence literature which has neglected to examine the overlap between civil wars and terrorism.
A look at the literature suggested a significant level of this comorbidity but did very little to
inform on the dynamics of the relationship at play (Findley & Young 2012). Previous studies
showed that the frequency of terrorism tends to increase immediately preceding and following
civil war, but little work had been done to understand the effect of terrorism on the civil war
process itself. With this in mind, I wanted to begin closing this gap by studying the way that the
impact of terrorism across different war types, looking specifically at identity based wars.
With the robust literature on ethnicity, civil war onset, and resolution, I decided to apply
several pre-existing theories to the speculated relationship between identity based civil wars and
terrorism. Drawing from theories of ethnic saliency, relative deprivation, and the security
dilemma, I argued that opposing identities (ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc.) would become more
salient within the context of civil wars that are based on identity claims. Furthermore, I
suggested that terrorist attacks would be more impactful in preventing peace in identity based
wars by triggering either onset or relapse of the ethnic security dilemma, wherein distrust would
significantly grow among groups and disrupt the peace process. I decided to narrow my focus,
looking only at terrorist attacks that fall into the category of spoiling in order to specifically
capture the impact that terrorist events have on civil war duration, recurrence and the peace
process overall.
From this theoretical foundation, I set forth two hypotheses. The Polarized Identity
hypothesis, the primary hypothesis at the core of this study, asserted that the warring parties in
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identity based civil wars will be more affected by any spoiling event that occurs, resulting in a
more durable war that takes longer to see resolution. My secondary hypothesis suggested that,
even without looking at the impact of spoiling, we should see spoiling occurring at a higher
frequency in identity based civil wars than in non-identity based civil wars. In order to ensure
that my results would address these hypotheses with as much robustness as possible, I employed
the use of several quantitative models in order to examine the impact of each variable carefully.
I began by looking at all the civil wars between 1970 and 2014 at the conflict level of
analysis and performed several correlational tests as well as a negative binomial regression.
Across those models, I found that civil war type does not seem to be significantly correlated with
the presence of spoiling, the amount of spoiling, or the duration of the conflict. Additionally,
looking at the interaction between war type and the presence of spoiling showed that the
interaction had no significant correlation to war duration. Rather, these initial tests showed
overwhelmingly that spoiling was the variable impacting duration most prominently. Both the
presence of spoiling and the number of spoiling events were positively correlated with war
duration.
To further understanding of these relationships, I expanded my data to look at the same
conflicts through a country-year unit of analysis and ran a series of Cox proportional hazard
models, looking at the way my variables influence the point at which a war either ends or recurs.
My results again showed overwhelmingly that spoiling, both the presence of and the amount, is
very significantly correlated with increased war duration, while war type does not appear to have
a significant effect. Interestingly, however, spoiling appeared to be negatively correlated with
war recurrence, indicating that there seems to be a different dynamic at play when a war recurs
than when it is still ongoing.
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Finally, I illustrated my results with a brief look at the civil wars in Lebanon and
Colombia. These cases present as two practically diametrically opposed conflicts, with Lebanon
as a war clearly entrenched in identity and sectarianism while Colombia’s war is entirely
political. Despite their opposition, these cases both present with the same level of spoiling and
seem to experience the effect of spoiling similarly.
The robust and consistent nature of these findings allows for several conclusions to be
drawn that shed a significant amount of light on the original gap that I identified in the literature.
First and foremost, spoiling appears to be happening uniformly across all civil war types, with no
significant distinction being detected between the frequency at which spoiling is occurring in
identity based wars compared to others. Additionally, the effect of spoiling is consistent across
civil war types, indicating that the impact of war type on conflict duration is not significant.
Rather, spoiling alone is the significant variable at play in the extension of civil war duration.
With these findings, I can conclusively reject both of my hypotheses; however, this study
does bring to light several important questions as well as implications for future work on the
subject. Over the course of this chapter, I will outline the difficulties I faced within this study, the
implications that my findings have on future research and relevant policy, and finally, my final
thoughts on the relationship between civil war, identity, and terrorism.
Complications in Methodology
In keeping with the gap in the literature on civil war and terrorism, I came across several
difficulties in acquiring the appropriate data for several variables. For the most part, I was able to
rely on sources of data that have been carefully vetted and are generally accepted by the field,
including the Correlates of War Project, the Polity5, and the World Bank. However, given the
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novelty of a few of my variables, it became difficult to rely on pre-existing datasets to capture
exactly what I was targeting.
This particularly became a problem with my measures of spoiling. The study of terrorism
as a whole is relatively new compared to the study of civil war and ethnicity, so the level of data
available on terrorism as a whole is already somewhat limited. Additionally, the focus on this
study was on spoiling, a type of terrorism which only entered the vernacular of the field in the
past fifteen years (Kydd & Walter 2006). This complicated the process of finding data, given that
datasets focused on terrorism have not yet developed subcategories of data based on the
typologies of terrorism that have been developed in the literature. Therefore, in order to ensure I
was capturing the events that fit spoiling, I had to carefully collect the data based on the actors
involved and the target of the event by looking year by year at the data available for each
country-year.
Given the novelty of both the concept of spoiling as well as the nature of the data
collection, it is important to note the limitations of this study’s ability to fully capture spoiling.
While I am confident in the dichotomous measure of spoiling, which indicated only presence and
absence, I want to emphasize that the count measure, the number of spoiling events, is likely a
rough estimate. While I attempted to ensure that this measure was as close as possible given the
data available, it would be critical to repeat this study with a more comprehensive data source
should it become available.
While certainly not to the same extent, I also faced a methodological hurdle when it came
to the measure of recurrence. As I briefly discussed in my study of the Lebanese civil war, the
Correlates of War Project, from which I sourced my conflict data, has a very strict definition of
civil war which complicated this variable. The COW requires at least 1,000 battle deaths within
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each calendar year in order to be considered a civil war; therefore, should a war dip below that
threshold in a single year, the COW would code the war as no longer ongoing despite no actual
resolution. Therefore, a war could appear as recurring, when rather it is ongoing but falling
below the defined threshold. This methodological discrepancy coupled with the interesting result
from the hazard model on recurrence suggest that it would be incredibly beneficial to revisit the
variable in the future in order to more accurately code it and better understand how it relates to
other variables.
Implications on Future Research
I began this study with the express purpose of beginning to make sense of the way
spoiling interacts with the civil war process and, while my findings have certainly brought
significant insights to the field, many incredibly important questions remain. Considering the
challenges I faced in the theoretical and methodological aspects of this study as well as the
findings, I believe that future research should work to further the current understanding of
spoiling, both as a unique form of terrorism and as it interacts with civil war, on the impact of
intervention, and on the factors that result in civil war recurrence.
In my work with the literature, it became abundantly clear that the field of political
violence as a whole would greatly benefit from a more uniform understanding of spoiling, both
conceptually and in operationally. The typologies of terrorism are still new relative to the study
of terrorism, so I believe that future research will work to fill in the gaps. Work to distinguish the
types of terror in data or to establish dataset specific to each type of terrorism should be the
highest priority at this point. While the tedious process of data collection employed for this paper
best satisfied the needs of my study, it revealed this major gap in the existing data that could be
hindering our understanding regarding the effects of terrorism. Future researchers and the
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literature of terrorism and political violence as a whole would undoubtedly benefit from having a
uniform understanding of spoiling that would allow for consistent coding of spoiling as a
variable and collection of data.
Beyond the basic conception of spoiling as isolated terror events, there is a significant
need to more closely examine the role that spoiling is playing in civil wars. One of the very first
things that stood out in the data collected was the prominence of spoiling across all civil war
types; this abundance suggests that spoiling may be a part of the civil war process rather than a
unique event that only comes about when wars meet certain conditions. A better understanding
of the role played by spoiling would allow us to better conceptualize spoiling and recognize it as
it occurs in civil conflicts. Additionally, if spoiling is a part of the civil war process, a more
robust literature on its interaction with conflict could better inform future peace-keeping efforts
and negotiations working to end conflict.
Finally, this study left a major question in the results that came about regarding
recurrence of civil war. While war type remained largely insignificant in relation to recurrence,
spoiling seemed to be negatively correlated with the recurrence of war. This finding is
particularly interesting, as it goes against both what the literature suggests and what would
logically make sense given the impact spoiling has on duration. I argue that the finding on
recurrence suggests that there is likely another factor aside from war type or spoiling that better
predicts or influences the likelihood that a war recurs. These results coupled with the general
lack of contemporary research done on the recurrence of civil wars leads me to argue that this
subject should be a priority for the field going forward. Particularly in a world where the
majority of global conflicts are civil war, it is of the utmost importance to know how to end these
conflicts and ensure that they are not at risk for recurrence; thus, a further study on recurrence is
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needed in order to identify the risk factors involved and develop more effective policy for the
resolution of civil wars.
Policy Implications
Given the scope and results of this study, it is important to acknowledge that further
research is needed in order to make conclusive policy recommendations. If and only if
subsequent replications of this study yield consistent findings in tandem with additional research
to fully understand and operationalize spoiling and recurrence should scholars begin to consider
real changes to policy. Particularly given the dicey results attributed to the recurrence of civil
war, significant further research should be undertaken to better understand the mechanisms at
work within this framework before I can advocate alterations to relevant policy. With this in
mind, my results do carry some policy implications that could warrant further investigation to
validate and confirm.
Given the finding that spoiling is significantly correlated to civil war duration, the major
implication suggests that policy relating to war resolution should revolve around building trust,
holding warring parties accountable, and minimizing terrorism. While we do need significantly
more research to better understand spoiling, the literature suggests that it operates primarily as a
tool of disruption by creating distrust among negotiating parties (Kydd & Walter 2006). The
findings of this study also suggest that spoiling is positively correlated with civil war duration,
suggesting that to decrease the frequency or effectiveness of spoiling events would in turn
decrease the duration of war. While significant additional work should be done to verify my
findings, expand our understanding of the relationship between spoiling and war, and to
investigate other factors associated with extended war duration, this study does imply that policy
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revolving around trust building among warring parties could be effective in reducing war
duration.
Reflections and Final Thoughts
In all, my results provided me with comprehensive and sufficient evidence to reject both of the
hypotheses that I set forth at the beginning of this study. While we know that identity based
communal conflict tends to play a significant role in the inception of civil war, the data suggests
that it may not have a significant impact on the civil war process beyond the onset of conflict.
Rather, spoiling seems to be playing a much bigger role in civil wars than the literature credits it
with, leaving significant room for additional research to further our understanding and flesh out
the mechanism through which spoiling impacts the duration of civil wars. Despite failing to
support my Polarized Identity hypothesis, my results surprised me and challenged both the
assumptions that I extrapolated as well as many assumptions set forth by the literature, filling in
some gaps in the field of political violence while also opening up some new ones.
Over the course of this study, I have worked to follow the standards, foundations, and
precedents set by others in the field that have engaged with similar questions. I believe that my
study has not only helped to answer some pre-existing questions but has also brought new
questions to the forefront and encouraged future research to take a more holistic approach in the
study of civil war and terrorism. In conclusion, I maintain that spoiling plays an integral role in
the process of civil wars that has been largely ignored by prior research and by the contemporary
policy regarding conflict resolution. In short, spoiling seems to be a major part of civil war, and
if the field is looking for a comprehensive understanding of the most prominent form of
contemporary global conflict, then it should work to understand civil war as a sum of its parts.
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Appendix I: Codebook

ccode

The number assigned to that specific conflict.

conflict

The name assigned to the conflict by the COW dataset.

country

The state that saw the majority of fighting throughout the duration of the war.

dury

The number of years the war lasted.

wartype

1 = Identity based war, 0 = Non-identity based war.

spoiling

1 = At least one spoiling event occurred, 0 = no spoiling events occurred.

spoilingnum The number of spoiling events that occurred
durable

1 = The conflict continued after this year, 0 = The conflict ceased within this
year.

recurred

1 = A prior conflict recurred within this year, 0 = a conflict did not recur within
this year.

population

The number of people living within the conflict’s country.

gdp

The “sum of marketed goods and services produced within the national
boundary, averaged across everyone who lives within this territory.”

ELF

The decimal score of ethnic fractionalization, with 0 = complete homogeneity, 1
= completely heterogeneity.

intv

1 = Intervention from a third party occurred, 0 = intervention from a third party
did not occur.

regime

The composite regime score, ranging from +10 (total democracy) to -10 (total
autocracy).

parties

The approximate number of actors party to the conflict.

history

1 = This country has a history of civil war in the 1900s, 0 = this country has no
history of civil war in the 1900s.

neighbors

1 = This country shares a border with another state engaging in violence, 0 =
this country shares no borders with other states engaging in violence.
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Appendix II: Tables
Table A.1 Conflict Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2 War Type and Spoiling Summary
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Table A.3 Conflict Correlation Matrix

Table A.4 Chi Square Analysis
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Table A.5 Binomial Regression Models
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Table A.6 Country-Year Descriptive Statistics
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Table 4.7 Country-Year Correlation Matrix
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Table A.8 Cox Proportional Hazard Durability Models
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Table A.9 Cox Proportional Hazard Recurrence Models
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Table A.10 Case Statistics: Colombia and Lebanon

Table A.11 Mean Spoiling per Year: Colombia and Lebanon

Table A.12 Difference of Means t-Test
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Appendix III: Conflict STATA DO File
*This DO File accompanies the DURATION dataset focused on the conflict unit of analysis. *
*The following lines produce the descriptive statistics*
summarize
tab wartype spoiling
pwcorr wartype dury spoiling spoilingnum ELF intv history neighbors, star(0.05)
*This line initiates the Chi2 test for correlation between war type and spoiling.*
tab wartype spoiling, chi2
*The following lines produce my negative bionomial regression models. *
nbreg dury wartype spoiling
nbreg dury wartype spoilingnum
nbreg dury wartype spoiling wartype#spoiling.
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Appendix IV: Country-Year STATA DO File
*This DO File accompanies the INTERACTION dataset focused on the country-year unit of
analysis. *
*These lines initiate the descriptive statistics. *
summarize
pwcorr wartype spoiling spoilingnum durable recurred population gdp ELF intv history
neighbors regime parties, star(0.05)
*The following lines create the hazard models for DURABILITY. *
stset year, failure(durable==0)
stcox wartype spoiling
stcox wartype spoilingnum
stcox wartype spoiling population gdp ELF intv history neighbors regime parties
stcox wartype spoilingnum population gdp ELF intv history neighbors regime parties
*The following lines create the hazard models for RECURRENCE. *
stset year, failure(recurred==1) scale(1)
stcox wartype spoiling
stcox wartype spoilingnum
stcox wartype spoiling population gdp ELF intv history neighbors regime parties
stcox wartype spoilingnum population gdp ELF intv history neighbors regime parties.
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